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Debt Monetization, QE, Inflation, Deflation and Expropriation PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Friday, 12 December 2014 01:44

Central Bank Large Scale Asset Purchases, by which is meant the buying of government or agency debt, is intended to ensure demand for such bonds and to keep borrowing costs low for the government and any other debt issuer whose cost of debt is correlated or benchmarked to government bond yields. Large Scale Asset Purchases, or QE, as they are popularly called, are meant to be a boost to the economy. The experiment has worked in the US, to  a certain extent. Lower borrowing costs have certain allowed corporate bond issuers to liquefy their balance sheets. Lower mortgage rates have spurred a rebound in housing prices which have led to healthier household balance sheets. The follow on impact from businesses to labour and employment has been slow.

QE directly funds government whereby a central bank buys bonds issued by the government. The central bank’s assets rise by the value of the bonds it has bought, and the liabilities rise by the same amount as it issues liabilities to fund the purchases. These can take the form of cash in the government’s reserve or cash accounts. It is convenient if the bonds are sufficiently highly rated that they consume no capital. It is hoped that central banks are thus able to help governments refinance themselves and buy enough time to return to fiscal balance and thus more attractive to private lenders. A growing economy is necessary, but not sufficient, for a government to improve its fiscal position through improving tax receipts. Fiscal profligacy can confound even a growing economy and rising tax receipts. It would appear that debt monetization cannot go on indefinitely if the government’s financial position is steadily deteriorating. Note that a constant budget deficit or a constantly rising level of debt has been demonstrated to be sustainable whenever there was sufficient domestic savings to fund this debt. It helps if the savers have no option but to fund this debt. In the absence of a such private funding there is debt monetization by central banks. The result, however, is an ever inflating balance sheet as more debt is issued to central banks in return for more printed money. This type of creative accounting can be quite persistent.

 

If rates rise and the bond prices fall, the central bank can either not mark them to market arguing that they will be held to maturity, or, they can mark them as available for sale and mark them to market. At that stage, any loss incurred by the bank will impact its equity. If the issuer, that is the government, buys back these bonds at below par, they will have made a profit equal to the loss incurred by the bank. The government could then recapitalize the bank by precisely the loss it had incurred in the first place. The value of the bonds, therefore, once in the hands of the central bank, are immaterial. This is pure money printing.

 

The government’s reserves with the central bank do not count as the money base. A government that is printing money is, however, likely not to leave too much money in its reserve account but to spend it quickly. The money thus finds its way to the commercial banks and becomes part of the money base. The money base is the multiplicand to which the velocity of money is multiplier in the identity that equates to nominal output. A sufficiently large money base makes an economy vulnerable to inflation or hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is usually a consequence of loss of confidence rather than a continuous process and will require more than an over inflated money base to trigger. But, persistent inflation can lead to a loss of confidence at some point.

 

Inflation aggregates domestic and external purchasing power. The measure of the external purchasing power of a currency is its exchange rate. Where debt monetization results in acute currency weakness, external inflation is already underway. This can impact headline inflation through imported goods and inputs.

 

In many ways, inflation is a signal rather than a lever. Targeting inflation religiously can distract policy from underlying causes. Disinflation can either be a result of productivity gains or deficient demand, or both. Persistent QE and low inflation can be a sign of an acutely weak economy as efforts at supporting sagging demand only just compensate for natural weakness. If the currency is also weak at the same time, it could signal that price support from rising costs were being compensated by substitution in a flexible economy with high productive efficiency which was also operating below capacity.

 

Where a country has financed itself in a foreign currency and or with foreign capital, as many emerging markets do, the ability to borrow is limited. Countries can default on debt not denominated in their own currency. The risk of default limits the demand for ever increasing issuance. Countries are not compelled to, but may choose to default on debt denominated in their own currency. Venezuela (1998), Russia (1998), Ukraine (1998), Ecuador (1999), Argentina (2001) are some examples. The ability to choose not to default, come hell or high water, on local currency debt, comes at a price, being the external value of that debt, thus the currency bears the brunt, and a de facto default occurs with a recovery rate equal to 100% less the depreciation of the currency relative to the bond holders base currency. Where the bond holders are hapless domestic investors, forced to lend to the government, no default de facto or technical occurs. Such investors would behave rationally if they save more to make up for the debasement of their forced saving and invest abroad as far as possible to compensate for the de facto expropriation. This can result in lower demand and deflation. Governments of such countries have to spend more to compensate for this demand deficiency, worsening their balance sheet and necessitating further debt monetization or de facto expropriation.

 

 
Ten Seconds Into The Future. 2015 Macro and Investment Outlook PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Wednesday, 26 November 2014 02:41

Themes: Risk On and Pray Hard.

 

Rates and Credit:

Long US treasuries at the long end. 30 year and 10 year USTs remain attractive relative to short end. Expect further curve flattening.

Overweight / Long China equities. Despite slowing economic growth, earnings growth remains robust and the PBOC will likely be expansionary and China equities are cheap compared with most international equity markets. Longer term prospects are supported by structural reform.

Developed market credit is still attractive but investors have to be selective. Despite healthy profits and balance sheets, US corporate credit is expensive and high yield particularly so.

European corporate credit remains attractive based on fundamentals but pricing is also getting stretched. We prefer idiosyncratic situations such as regulation driven bank recapitalization trades.

European bank capital is a trade which is long in the tooth but remains attractive as ECB policy supports the recapitalization and reorganization of bank balance sheets.

The leveraged loan market is underpinned by healthy fundamentals but secondary market liquidity is becoming a concern. Fundamentals remain healthy with default rates likely to be in the 2% region with high recoveries in the coming year. The risk of a sharp correction is significant but such should be regarded as a buying opportunity.

In securitized products, US non agency RMBS remains an attractive asset class despite the trade being long in the tooth. Agency RMBS derivatives are cheap and can be used to also hedge a long duration portfolio. Australian RMBS has done well but bonds are now expensive. European ABS and covered bonds will be underpinned by the ECBs asset purchase programs.

The thirst for yield has caused the high yield market to run ahead of itself. Generally, globally, we prefer investment grade to high yield on a relative value basis as high yield is now trading tight to investment grade.

Underweight LatAm equities and corporate bonds. With the exception of Mexico, the region is in or close to stagflation on the back of over-reliance on China demand for commodities and failure to reform or a regression towards inefficient and populist policies.

Equities:

US equities are not cheap but they are supported by strong fundamentals. Relative to other regions, US equities have the advantage. While a long term buy, valuations are too rich. To buy US domestic risk, look to credit. High yield is similarly expensive, however, so focus on private label mortgages and investment grade corporates.

China equities will benefit from the PBOC’s newly accommodative stance. Despite strong growth and cheap valuations, China equities have been constrained by tight monetary conditions at home. This is already changing with noticeable effect. Buy the domestic listings.

European equities were cheap but no longer. The international nature of European equities and the level of dispersion in their financial performance means that Europe is an excellent place to generate alpha. The rate and policy environment do, however, recommend corporate credit ahead of equities as the more efficient trade expression. In Europe, underweight equities in favour of credit.

Reform countries including India, Indonesia and Japan will be well supported as investment is revived. Where corporate governance lags the developed markets, side with business owners and own the equity instead of the debt.


FX and Commodities:

The long USD trade has become an alarmingly consensus trade. While the long term fundamentals are constructive for the USD, volatility is picking up and a trading strategy is recommended. The obvious candidates to short are the EUR and JPY where policy is decidedly in favour and economies are sufficiently weak that the US will tolerate the clearly mercantilist policy.

China’s slowdown may be more pronounced than reported or expected. This will likely trigger more infrastructure investment boosting basic materials and industrial metals.


Last Updated on Thursday, 27 November 2014 00:00
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China. A positive outlook at last. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 04 November 2014 00:49

The China A share market surged last week. It is time to reiterate my optimistic appraisal of the China market. It is not too late.

Back in July, we noted that

  1. China equities were underowned.
  2. China equities were trading cheap.
  3. China equities had been in a 6 year bear market. This was most likely the consequence of the PBOC’s tight monetary conditions.

We postulated that the PBOC’s stance was driven by inflation concerns in the traded goods sector and the volatility in the commodities and food markets. 3 years ago food prices were rising at nearly 15% YOY and has since hovered between 2.5% to 5% since. It is likely that the PBOC views the US Fed’s expansionary balance sheet policy as a source of inflation in the traded goods sector and felt it necessary to compensate. Another concern was the growth of the Shadow Banking system in the form of off balance sheet funding vehicles. This is a more complicated topic but one which I believe has less of an impact on PBOC policy. The reason is that credit can be isolated in a semi closed economy whereas traded goods are sufficiently open to be impacted by international flows.

The trigger for the buy recommendation was the impending end to the US Fed’s expansionary balance sheet policy. With the end of QE, while the Fed’s balance sheet will not likely shrink quickly, or at all in the short term, it is at least static. The latitude that this provides the PBOC in expanding liquidity to support a slowing economy is important. China’s inflation has slowed to 1.6% with food inflation down to 2.3%. Widespread global disinflation will impact the traded goods markets in China providing further room for expansionary policy. The impact on semi closed markets, whether by nature or regulation, such as services and asset markets, is inflationary.

I previously held that China had a long term innovation deficit and that it had to buy or otherwise acquire technology. I am still of this view, but there are nuances to that view. The cutting edge of technology remains in the developed Western economies, bit China is catching up. There is a chance that this long term trajectory can be reversed.For investors and traders, a shorter time frame is more relevant.

One of the more important developments in China took place last week. The Fourth Plenum produced a number of interesting and constructive signals. The Central Committee chose to reduce the influence of local level officials over the legal system, establishing circuit courts with greater independence from local Party officials. There was some woolly announcement about accountability and transparency of government but details were scant. The most important announcement was the elevation of the constitution within the rule of law. The consensus is that the Party’s authority would not be weakened by constitutionalism but an optimist would hope that while the Party might not be compelled to work within the constitution, it might work with the constitution to more efficiently and fairly govern the country. Certainly this focus on the constitution places the anti corruption efforts in a less cynical perspective.

Bottom line: We are likely to have an expansionary PBOC and we are hopeful that concrete legislative reform is underway. At the same time we have cheap stocks and healthy growth at a time when developed markets face deflation risks and other emerging markets like LatAm face stagflationary risks, China is a good place to invest.

Last Updated on Tuesday, 04 November 2014 00:53
 
Fed Funding Treasury PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 23 September 2014 04:30

The current interest expense on public debt of the US treasury presents an interesting picture. Given the current term structure, 2 year treasury FRN’s are an extremely attractive means of financing. They trade at some 4 basis points over 3 month T bills, which trade at about a basis point.

Assuming that the 3 month T bill trades up to 230, which is where the 2 year 2 year forwards are trading, this means that the existing stock of FRNs would see an increase in interest expense from 0.01% of total debt service, to 0.6%, an almost negligible increment. The math changes if the issuance accelerates. If we cynically assumed that the Fed worked only for the Treasury, a CFO would look at the trade off of financing between 2 yr fixed and the floating rate, in 2 years time. If the 2 yr rate was 230, then what latitude would the Fed have in raising interest rates? It turns out, quite a lot.

Unfortunately, at this point, I have not the resources to conduct a thorough study of the US treasury’s funding needs and planned issuance and what a rational CFO would structure the balance sheet. Let's see if I can co-opt the research team to do some work for me...

Just as an aside and an aide memoire…

For the year 2014, UST issuance will roughly look like:

160+m of 2y FRN

168m of 30y

260m of 10y

350m of 7y

420m of 5y

340m of 3y

360m of 2y

 
Policy Fatigue in Europe PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 18 September 2014 23:33

 

There is policy fatigue in Europe. The recent LTRO has had poor take up, a mere 83 billion eur compared to 290 billion at the first 3 year LTRO.

The first LTRO allowed banks in the euro area to do something they had not been able to before, to trade out of their foreign debt and into their local debt, and to buy more bonds. It was an outsourced QE. The current LTRO allows banks to do nothing new. In fact, the conditional nature of this LTRO makes it less attractive. Moreover, the euro area banks are in the midst of recapitalization and until this is done, LTRO’s are merely liquidity operations that require capital for animation, capital which is yet scarce.

This is positive for Europe. A ‘big gun’ solution might be a better analgesic but this current incremental policy provides a protracted and incremental support for European risk assets. It is, to be clear, a dangerous game, but it lifts the market steadily. Given the tepid response to the LTRO the ECB will be forced to do more, and do more it will.

Let me make a wild and reckless forecast. The ECB will design a TBA market for ABS underwriting not only secondary market ABS but blind pool primary issues, in effect co-opting the commercial banks to be their originators.

 

Last Updated on Thursday, 18 September 2014 23:35
 
The Putin Problem PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Friday, 05 September 2014 06:47

 

What does Putin want? It’s not clear. It’s likely he wants more than Ukraine. Those who believed that he would stop with South Ossetia and Abkhazia were wrong.

What drives Putin? Avenging the humiliation of the USSR is a clear motivation. Having held arbitrary power within the KGB, he longs to exercise it again. He does so within Russian territory but he longs to exercise it at least to the extent of the old Soviet boundaries.

How does Putin operate? He sows discord among his enemies. He knows when to hold and when to fold but he’s always at the table. He doesn’t need allies, only that his enemies are not completely aligned. He relies on his enemies not being committed to action, a glimmer of fear, a seam of pacifism.

He lives by obfuscation, behaves erratically, arbitrarily and disingenuously. In a word, he is capricious.

Those who engage him are bewildered by his irrationality, a gambit he employs well. They misread him. The illogic is designed to confuse and to conceal a deeper logic which is only revealed when it is too late. Putin needs to be dealt with firmly. Europe’s prevarication plays into his hands. Their measured and considered approach is based more in hope than experience and they will pay for it. This man does not mean to stop at Ukraine. Nor are his ambitions circumscribed by geography. He is a danger to Europe and to world order. Deal with him meekly and the world will pay.

 

Last Updated on Friday, 05 September 2014 06:50
 
Rates, Bonds, Inflation. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 25 August 2014 01:05

The near term direction of rates and bonds are not dependent on whether or not the Fed actually hikes rates in Q3 2015 or Q1 2016. They are dependent on when the market thinks the Fed will hikes rates in Q3 2015 or Q1 2016. It is clear from the ruminations of central bankers that they themselves don’t know when they will hike rates; so much is dependent on data. Each piece of data exerts a pull on the Fed, some towards raising rates and some towards delaying the day.

  1. The US economy is stronger than the Fed or the market thinks. Especially relative to the new lower long term potential mean.
  2. The labour market is healthier than consensus.
  3. Economic nationalism will favor economies with a deep consumer base, intellectual property generation and manufacturing capability. NAIRU will, however, be lower.
  4. Inflation may surprise on the upside. Inflation could arrive sooner than expected as slack in the economy is underestimated.
  5. The US treasury’s funding requirements may be lower than expected on the back of stronger tax revenues.
  6. The substitution of funding type from fixed coupon to floating creates a relative shortage of fixed coupon.
  7. War may change the funding requirements for Treasury. Currently, however, military spending is expected to continue to decline.

Point 1 above allows one to trade around cyclical assets as the market misjudges the cycle by misjudging growth relative to long term mean. Cyclical slowdowns are pauses which can be misinterpreted as fails creating buy opportunities. Cyclical lows are misjudged as fails when in fact they are inflexion points. Trading should be buying and selling earlier than the consensus cycle.

Point 2, 3 and 4 may introduce volatility to the treasury market and duration assets. Point 5 and 6 could imply a relative oversupply of corporate duration relative to sovereigns translating into spread widening.

Points 5 and 6 in isolation of 2, 3 and 4 suggest buying the dips of longer dated treasuries. Unless 7 takes hold.

 

 

 

 

 
Credit Market Turbulence. How To Think About Credit Investing August 2014 PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Wednesday, 06 August 2014 06:38

After a year of abnormally low volatility, high yield markets are correcting across the globe. Since 2008 the high yield market has experienced 3 bouts of turbulence

  1. The European sovereign crisis in 2011.
  2. The “Taper Tantrum” of 2013.
  3. The last few weeks.

Why have high yield credit markets exhibited this volatility recently?

Read more...
 
Ten Seconds Into The Future. July 2014 PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 15 July 2014 23:19

Equity, bond, FX, swaption and commodity volatility have one thing in common. They have contracted steadily from 2008/9 levels to 2006 levels, almost in lockstep. To some, this is a sign of complacency, to others, calm.

Last Updated on Wednesday, 16 July 2014 06:41
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THoughts about Asset and Goods Price Inflation. Explaining Stock and Bond Market Performance under QE. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Wednesday, 18 June 2014 23:46

There is more to MV=PQ than meets the eye.

Central banks can expand M but this does not mean they can expand MV. V can always fall to compensate for the increase in M, as has happened for most of the period 2008 – 2014. The maintenance or expansion of V is dependent on a number of things. Necessary conditions include a functioning fractional reserve banking system with sufficient capital and appropriate reserve ratios to transmit the increases in V. Sufficient conditions include a health demand for credit which is dependent on business sentiment.

Assuming that it is possible to increase MV, the impact on PQ and its constituents remain complicated. While PQ is a scalar, P and Q are in fact vectors. Q is a list of all the possible stuff you can spend money on, and P is the corresponding vector of prices. A couple of things to note about Q are that it includes goods, services, and assets, indeed, anything you can allocate money to, and that while the scalar PQ must rise if MV does, its not clear a) which good, service or asset market is experiencing rising nominal output or b) for a given good, service or asset market experiencing rising nominal output whether price, real output or both are rising. In other words, even if MV and therefore PQ is rising, some markets may experience falling nominal output while others may experience rising nominal output and in markets with rising nominal output it could all be due to inflation or real growth or both, but you couldn’t control which. 

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Quantitative Easing and Taper in the Context of Debt Monetization. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 29 April 2014 01:28

 

If we stop thinking about QE as an expansionary policy but rather as a treasury refinancing operation and debt monetization, the behavior of the Fed becomes clearer. For one, the Fed surely understands that without reducing the banking system’s reserve requirements, the money multiplier and the velocity of money cannot accelerate and thus asset purchases have very little impact on real or nominal output. Indeed by increasing capital requirements, the Fed is effectively neutralizing any expansionary effects of QE. A side effect of refinancing the treasury is an expanded balance sheet which risks runaway inflation should the velocity of money pick up. Any sign of improved fiscal position must encourage a corresponding reduction in asset purchases.

The impact on pricing of the term structure due to the Fed going forward should be regarded as at best neutral.

 

Last Updated on Monday, 12 May 2014 01:02
 
Risk. Capital. Conventional Asset Allocation is Inadequate. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 27 March 2014 07:45

It is almost elementary to professional investors that when investment decisions are made, the appropriate sizing of the investment is based on the quantity of risk that is taken and not the quantity of capital. This has a parallel in the Sharpe Ratio measurement of investment performance. Returns are only useful in the context of the risk associated in obtaining them. Similarly, returns are obtained at a price, which is risk. To obtain returns, one should allocate risk and not capital.

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Divergence Between US Equities and US Treasuries PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 18 March 2014 01:52

The divergence between the US treasury market and US equities can be accounted for.

  1. US treasury yields are held down because.
    1. Floating rate note issuance is expected to be circa 180 billion USD. This will substitute away some of the fixed coupon issuance. This means less supply of fixed coupons.
    2. Tax receipts are up which will also slow the issuance of treasuries.
    3. Major trading partners such as China and Japan are seeing a reduction of trade surpluses or an increase in trade deficits implying slowing supply of USD offshore and thus weaker demand for treasuries.

  1. US equity markets:
    1. Economic growth remains robust. There was a speed bump due to the harsh winter but this has passed.
    2. Trend growth is not 3% but 2%. Given this, any ‘fail’ of the 3% mark is not a risk of reception but a cyclical slowdown within a global rising trend. Since 2010 GDP YOY has oscillated around 2%, which I regard as the new trend growth rate. Why is trend growth lower today than before? This is not an easy question and there are no definitive answers. One possibility is that credit creation has become impaired. Despite efforts to inflate the monetary base, bank regulation and scarcity of bank capital are constraining credit creation. The 3% average growth rate from 1980 – 2006 was probably boosted by a full 1% due to the early 80’s boom in junk bond issuance, the securitization of debt in the late 1980’s and the surge in securitized and tranched mortgage bonds in the last 15 years. Absent this credit innovation, trend growth would have been 2% as it is now.
    3. Given the above view of a secular recovery, US equities are in a secular bull market. That said, we could be at a cyclical peak given that price levels have run ahead of earnings.
    4. The continuation of the current cyclical bull requires a recovery in corporate investment which has not yet happened. The growth of the past 5 years has been driven by consumption and housing. Corporate profitability is now at a cyclical high and household savings rates have fallen from mid 5’s to low 4’s. While US equities remain fundamentally sound, a continuation of earnings growth now stands on a single pillar, corporate investment. I believe this will happen given the average age of the capital stock…

  1. Conclusion:
    1. I expect the US treasury market to be more resilient than consensus for reasons of demand and supply.
    2. I expect the US equity market to be in the early stages of a secular bull market.
    3. However, I do feel that the US equity market is currently vulnerable as fundamentals have yet to catch up to valuations.

 
Ten Seconds into 2014. More of the same. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 03 February 2014 06:05

The current volatility in global markets is unremarkable. What is remarkable is the lack of volatility in the past two years. The macro conditions envisaged in mid 2012 continue to hold. For details see:

Investment Strategy In a Crazy World April 2012

To reiterate:

  1. Long term global growth rate has stabilized along a slower growth path, mainly due to moderation in credit creation.
  2. Developed Markets (DM) rebalance towards a neutral trade balance. Emerging Markets (EM) also rebalance towards neutral trade balance. Generally this is the rebalancing of economies towards better balance between investment, consumption and trade.
  3. Aiding the resurgence of exports and manufacturing in DM is an entrenched technological or knowledge advantage.
  4. Trade flows are supportive of USD.
  5. Trade flows are raising true cost of funds for hard currencies.

Inferences:

Last Updated on Monday, 03 February 2014 06:07
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Fed Issues Floating Rate Notes. An Aside on the 30Y UST. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Friday, 24 January 2014 08:59

For the first time in 17 years, the US treasury will issue a new security, a Floating Rate Note. This will become a program of quarterly auctions.  Why are they doing this?

 

  1. How does one get longer term funding at low interest rates? How does one attract investors to longer maturity assets with little or no duration?
  2. How will the US government keep debt service manageable over time despite longer dated liabilities?
    • The answer to 1 above is to issue Floating Rate Notes.
    • The answer to 2 above is to maintain short term interest rates at close to zero for longer. Given that the first issues will be 2 year maturities and coupons will be benchmarked to the 13 week T bill rate, I expect that the US Fed will not be raising interest rates till 2016 at the earliest.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/u-s-treasury-to-offer-15-billion-in-first-floating-rate-notes.html

On a side note, I expect the long bond (that’s the 30 year US treasury) to outperform. While I don’t like duration in general I don’t think the 10 year will fare as badly as the consensus believes. The 30 year, however, is under-issued, and demand from insurance companies and other real money investors with long term liabilities will keep it well supported. I expect the USD curve will form a hump at the 10 year. I’d be a buyer of the 30 year UST.

On another side note:Time to buy some GLD US. Time to buy some equity volatility. Some cracks are beginning to show.

 
Gold. Just Another Thought. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Friday, 05 December 2014 06:59

Gold.

To determine the value of an object one has to determine its usefulness. To determine the price of an object one has to understand the convolutions of the collective human mind.

Last Updated on Friday, 05 December 2014 07:41
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China Outlook 2015 PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 13 November 2014 23:59

The Chinese government has focused on a number of things some of which include:

  • An anti corruption initiative.
  • Rebalancing the economy towards domestic consumption.
  • Maintaining financial stability and a certain level of economic growth.

The anti corruption initiative is a long term structural reform to strengthen the rule of law in China. The government appears to be serious about the rule of law despite doubts from many observers who see the law as a means of control. The Fourth Plenum saw an elevation of the Constitution which may signal that China is, albeit gradually, shifting to a rule by institution than by person. The anti corruption initiative is, however, a brake on growth, as many investment decisions and projects have corrupt elements in them and these projects may either fall away or need to be reorganized in a more acceptable form. Expect delays.

The rebalancing of the economy is an important factor in assessing China’s prospects. Most countries must by now recognize that globalization has been slowed if not reversed post 2008 as countries struggle to grow. In the aftermath of the crisis, the calculus recognized the constraints on fiscal policy, consumption and investment and naturally defaulted to exports to fuel growth. This placed the world in a state of a cold trade and currency war. In such an environment, currencies would range trade. Logical tolerable bounds would be 2007 levels for JPY and 2008 levels for the European currencies. These countries must also realize that the cold trade war is nearly over and that long term solutions need to be found besides beggaring thy neighbor. Cold wars are sometimes a balance of tacit collusions and conflicts. The end of such conditions will likely drive countries to pursue greater self sufficiency. A base of domestic demand and consumption is an important resource in the face of slowing or reduced globalization.

For many reasons, China’s growth is slowing. One reason is that unless one is the generator and owner of intellectual property, one’s economy is hostage to being a low cost producer. When costs rise, business moves elsewhere. China has long had a technological disadvantage compared with the West. It clearly recognizes this. The number of patents filed by Chinese firms has accelerated recently relative to the rest of the world.


 

It is hoped that this push to improve its competitiveness in intellectual property will result in higher productivity and a higher long term growth rate. In the meantime, however, growth has slowed from the double digit pace in the early 2000s to 7.3% at latest count. Some observers are quoting a rate of just sub 6% actual growth this year, slowing in 2015 and the coming years. If the economy indeed slows along this path, policy must be expected to adjust to a more accommodative state.

It can be argued that the PBOC misread the impact of the US Fed led global QE and easing policy on price levels in China. Certainly inflation rose steadily from 2009 to 2011 during which food price inflation ran into double digits. Concerned about inflation through tradable goods markets, the PBOC has been too tight. The low inflation in Europe, the US and Japan, the falling domestic inflation and the end of US QE has prompted the PBOC to switch to a more accommodative state. This will likely steady tradable goods while creating inflation in services and semi-closed asset markets.

If growth should slow more than planned it is likely that China will resume growing the economy through investment in infrastructure. This could provide some respite to commodity metals and energy markets regionally as well as globally. (Miners have been acutely weak of late and could represent a buying opportunity if China growth slows much more.) Another area of potential interest would be European and US industrial equipment companies.

Generally, the outlook for China is positive. Equities are relative cheap and growth is robust. The one impediment to the Chinese stock markets has been an overly tight PBOC. With a neutral to accommodative stance, the latent investment themes can be animated.


Longer term risks:

There are of course risks associated with investing in China. The anti corruption drive will deal, if tangentially, with corporate governance. There is a risk that the campaign might be a cynical and politically motivated power consolidation exercise. Only time will tell but the focus on constitutionalism is an optimistic signal.

The growth of leverage in the corporate and local government sectors, enabled by the bond and nascent securitization markets has been an area of concern. However, most of the debt is local currency denominated and therefore within the control of the government. Central government and household balance sheets are not overly leveraged. This will allow the government to bailout any credit issues that threaten to become systemic. A strong current account is not entirely relevant to the potential imbalances in Chinese credit markets but is a help in case of contagion into the hard currency credit markets.

Perhaps one of the most intractable risks to China is its irrevocable progress and the concomitant social change. The Umbrella Movement in HK, the troubles in Western China and Tibet, threaten the status quo. Government has to address the needs and wants of a new generation facing rising wealth and at the same time greater inequality. Greater freedom of information complicates this task. China’s vagueness about whether it is a secular (prescribed by the constitution) or atheist (preferred by the party) state remains unresolved, a dangerous condition given the correlation between ethnicity and religion in a country with significant diversity.

Geopolitically, the world has become a harsher place. The years leading up to 2008 saw relatively little turbulence between the major powers as credit fuelled prosperity tempered old rivalries. The world was, is and ever shall be a contentious place, however, pre 2008, the conflicts were localized and fragmented. The deceleration of globalization, the cold trade war, the competitive devaluations and monetary debasement make the post 2008 environment more fractious and fraught. The relationship between China, the US and Russia will have important strategic implications. One country is governed by institutions and offices, another by a party apparently shifting towards governance by institutions and offices, and the third by a man. The scope for policy miscalculations and mistakes are high.

 


Last Updated on Friday, 14 November 2014 00:07
 
Proper ECB QE. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Friday, 31 October 2014 07:52

ECB QE:

QE is not just quantitative, it is qualitative. Until underwriting standards are dropped, credit creation in the private sector Eurozone will be moribund. How can the ECB get it going again? Purchasing sovereign bonds will do nothing more than flatten term structures and tighten sovereign CDS spreads making it cheaper for governments to borrow. This is not the idea since fiscal rectitude is still expected even of the Club Med, at least by the Germans. At best it helps debt service a bit. Buying off the run corporate and covered bonds and ABS will not help either since it does not encourage new lending. In any case the market for covered bonds and ABS is too small for the ECB to be really effective. To be really effective, the ECB needs to be bold and reckless. It needs to underwrite blind pools of ABS and agree to purchase ABS printed on a TBA (to be announced) basis, where any collateral pool conforming to predetermined criteria are eligible. There is currently only one market which operates on this basis: US agency mortgage backed securities. QE there at least has kept mortgage rates down and spurred a durable housing recovery thus improving household balance sheets and reinvigorated HELOC origination. If the ECB abandons prudence and embarks on underwriting TBAs, private commercial banks will be converted into outsourced or third party credit underwriting agents, earning fees instead of spreads and deploying less scarce capital.

 
Global Macro: Deglobalization, Inequality and Country Risk Premia PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 22 September 2014 00:25

Globalization and the opening of trade and capital between countries led to a reduction in income and wealth inequality between countries. The mobility of financial and intellectual capital also led to a widening of inequality within each country. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, countries have had to reexamine their economic and commercial models. Domestic inflexibility has led many countries to pursue mercantilist policies aimed at gaining a competitive advantage over trading partners. Re-shoring is an example of a large scale, secular theme associated with mercantilism. From 2008, the world has witnessed a slowing of globalization. Countries have incentives to deglobalize. Large, developed countries with sufficient domestic demand will pursue this strategy while traditional exporters who have weaker intellectual property generation capabilities are likely to recognize the balance of power and pursue their own domestically focused policies. Deglobalization is likely to lead to a divergence in income and wealth between countries, reversing the trend of the period of globalization. There is no evident impact on income and wealth inequality within countries. That is left to a separate analysis. Country risk premia have diverged since 2008, most notably within the Eurozone, albeit for reasons surrounding the robustness of its currency union, and appear to be driven by deglobalization. This is a long term trend with implications for security valuation across equities and credit globally.

 
Scottish Independence PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 08 September 2014 01:43

 

Whether Scotland gains its independence will not only be a question of logic and rationality but of nationalism and emotion as well. Why do the Scots want independence? Why not? Some 300 years ago Scotland was an independent country. Lately, every 18 years, the Scots have brought up the issue of independence.

Scotland wants to decide what’s best for Scotland. It clearly believes that the decisions in Westminster have not been optimal for Scotland. This is the single most compelling argument for independence. It believes that the revenues from North Sea Oil have been squandered or misdirected and that an independent Scotland could follow in the footsteps of Norway with the creation of an oil financed Sovereign Wealth Fund. It feels that Westminster has neglected Scotland generally, but particularly in investment and infrastructure. Be that as it may, the calculus around North Sea Oil is equivocal. At current production, reserves are expected to last 30 years. Independence is expected to last longer than that.

Lately, indications are that the pro independents will win the referendum. There are issues to be addressed in the event of a separation.

The currency is an important consideration. An independent Scotland will need a currency. It currently uses the sterling pound. Scottish bank notes are not in fact legal tender anywhere, not even in Scotland, and are therefore legally a form of promissory note. Scotland will have to establish a currency and decide on the basis o that currency, whether it will continue to use sterling as part of a currency union, use sterling without a currency union, join the Euro or have an independent currency and central bank. Options 1 and 3 require the concurrence of the BoE and ECB respectively. Either will impose conditions which will likely severely limit monetary policy independence.

In any divorce, the balance sheet needs to be divided. This includes assets and liabilities. Each side wants the assets but not the liabilities. The Scots will understandably claim the North Sea oil reserves as their assets. How exactly the national debt will be distributed will be interesting to see. The question goes beyond the proportion of the national debt that gets allocated to an independent Scotland but to defining the new conditions of default for English and Scottish debt.

 

 


 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 09 September 2014 04:46
 
The Human Condition. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 04 September 2014 08:55

There is no such thing as an omnipotent central planner, even if the central planner has complete and perfect information and has unlimited resources and ultimate technology. Even an almost omnipotent central planner would not be able to satisfy everybody’s wants and needs. Sci Fi has explored such Utopian scenarios before but while they have examined the technological and social aspects of such societies, the economic aspects can confound. For one, if you give everyone all that they need, they will go crazy comparing their endowments with one another. Envy will animate avarice and before long contention and conflict will ensue. This is the human way. One mitigating strategy might be to endow each agent equally. However, different agents have different utility functions and the equal endowments will be valued differently. Envy will animate avarice and before long contention and conflict will ensue. Assuming that the central planner had access to all private information as well, it might allocate so as to equalize utility. However, utility is variable over time. Before long the equality of utility is broken and everything again descends into hostility.

Perhaps a central planner might sell the concept that each agent has the opportunity to exceed the utility of their competitors if they were good and worked hard. This is selling hope and hope is the most powerful thing ever. What precisely is that hope? It is the hope that an agent who considers themselves as inadequately endowed can achieve an equal or higher utility than their peers. That is, that they have a chance of being above average. Clearly not more than 50% of the population can be above average. It is therefore the hope that one can be above average, or equivalently, that one is not one of the 50% who will be below average.

Coincidentally, the efforts to achieve above average utility drive the population towards progress and growth. Efforts to remain above average are as strong as efforts to become above average. If all are equally successful and achieve the same incremental success, then the status quo ordinality is maintained and the efforts are ultimately futile. If the below average are more driven, under conditions of equal opportunity, they may gain an advantage over the better endowed and thus equalize the distribution of wealth. The newly below average will then strive to excel and the perpetual cycle continues.

If for whatever reason the above average excel relative to the below average then the distribution of wealth becomes more unequal. The probability of being able to move from below average to above average shrinks. In other words, hope is eroded. How might the better endowed excel relative to the less well endowed? There are all kinds of possibilities. The wherewithal to lobby government, ownership of capital, investment in knowledge and intellectual capital, networks, nepotism, the ability to cope with volatility and the unexpected are some examples. Inequality cannot increase without a point at which hope is lost, that is the probability of the below average catching up to the average or above average becomes improbably low. At this point the status quo is likely to be challenged.

What if the central planner has real time perfect information and can redistribute wealth in real time? Such a redistribution while it may bring agents into a position of equal utility on a pre-redistribution basis, will likely lead to agents valuing each redistribution payment or debit differentially. The perceived arbitrary nature of the redistribution will impair the perception of hope and is thus self defeating. Is it possible to take into account the differential valuation of the incremental transfers? Yes, but this creates a feedback loop which renders the solution hard to obtain and highly unstable. This difficulty and instability of the solution necessitates frequent adjustments to the basis of the redistribution which will render it indistinguishable from arbitrary redistribution, which again impairs the perception of fairness and hope, and is self defeating.

Absolute acceleration in aggregate wealth increases hope and stability. Absolute deceleration or negative growth in wealth decreases hope and stability. Extreme equality slows growth. Moderate to high inequality promotes growth. Acute inequality violates the social contract and leads to disruption.

 

Last Updated on Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:18
 
Ten Seconds Into The Darkness PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 21 August 2014 06:57

Central banks have been printing money aggressively since 2008. The US Fed is now slowing its money printing with a view to a static stance in the near future. What are the consequences for markets and the economy?

When money is printed it has to go somewhere. So far it has gone into asset markets to a far greater extent than it has to the real economy. The transmission mechanism from large scale asset purchases and suppressed interest rates has directed liquidity to stabilizing the mortgage market, and keeping interest rates low across the USD term structure. This has stabilized the housing market and restored household balance sheets to stronger equity positions, strengthened bank balance sheets through their mortgage loan portfolios, and driven yield seeking investors to supporting the corporate bond market which in turn finances share buybacks buoying the equity markets. The impact of QE on financial markets and capital values has been significant yet the impact on the real economy, on employment and wages and on cash flows has been less ebullient.

After 3 rounds and 5 years of QE we are only beginning to see some impact on employment, investment and output. Yet the Fed began, in 2013, to slow its Large Scale Asset Purchases and is expected to end it altogether by October 2014. It is unclear when the Fed will actually either raise rates or shrink its balance sheet; it is currently expected to continue to reinvest coupon and maturing bond principal. The implications of an expanding Fed balance sheet are now known but what about the effects of a static or shrinking balance sheet?

The transmission of QE has thus far directed liquidity to asset markets, notably the agency mortgage backed securities market and the US treasury market. Liquidity, however, has struggled to spur bank lending to financing growth as banks lend out of capital and not just liquidity, and the SMEs which rely on bank lending have faced tight credit underwriting standards. The treatment of riskier, smaller loans under bank regulatory capital rules also hampers such lending. Larger businesses, usually with listed equities, have access to the corporate bond market and have taken advantage of lower rates to raise debt capital. Companies with listed equities have aggressively raised debt to buy back shares thus increasing earnings per share growth without the challenge of having to actually grow their businesses organically. Smaller companies without listed equities do not have this luxury.

That business investment has been slow is concerning. Corporates have raised significant levels of debt in the bond markets, yet hold substantial cash on balance sheet, or engage in share buybacks and M&A. Surveys of business sentiment notwithstanding, the actions of business leaders is not encouraging.

Equity valuations in the developed markets are no longer cheap. Even in Europe, the market has been selective and quality is expensive. Asia is the only region showing any significant value. Yet for equities to push higher, assuming fundamentals are in place, liquidity needs to flow into the asset class. The US Fed is close to neutral, the BoJ, ECB and BoE are all expansionary and the PBoC is probably at an inflection point ready to run loose again. As long as the world's central banks are in aggregate accommodative, markets will find some support. Under neutral liquidity, such as in the US, for equity and other risky assets to rise, liquidity must be diverted from the real economy. The equity market is therefore highly vulnerable to inflation since such would signal a substation to current consumption. Low inflation has been a sign that liquidity was being directed to investment. The other example is Europe, where inflation has been significantly below expectations and targets. Absent direct asset purchases, a pick up in inflation is in fact a bear signal.

The current structure of the economy is possibly a consequence of income and wealth inequality and that policy has favored the rich. Whereas expansionary monetary policy is normally inflationary, where the benefits of such policy accrue to the rich, the tendency to save or invest the new wealth is high and the marginal propensity to consume is low. Perhaps this is one price of inequality: that monetary policy is blunted and diverted towards more investment and less consumption. Policy makers may wish to consider how the distribution of wealth impacts policy efficacy. Policy that is blind to the distribution of wealth and income can create positive feedback loops which lead to unstable paths or accumulating imbalances.

6 years after the crisis, monetary and fiscal policies have not improved the economy significantly, especially when taken in the context of the financial resources and measures deployed. Global growth has slowed, unemployment remains high and where it has recovered has done so at the expense of the participation rate, income inequality has worsened at the individual and commercial level and geopolitical turbulence has risen, in part from America’s energy boom but in no small part due to growth withdrawal symptoms. What is concerning is that central banks and governments appear to have exhausted their crisis management resources and tools. Interest rates are acutely low, negative in the Eurozone, central bank balance sheets are grossly inflated, and sovereign balance sheets while improving, remain fragile. That inflation is low is a relief for high inflation would inflict serious losses for holders of duration heavy assets such as government bonds which fill the balance sheets of many commercial banks, but low inflation is also failing to erode the value of the stock of debt.

How long can central banks and governments go on supporting asset markets in the hope that sentiment can drag along the real economy? How long can wealth and income inequality continue or worsen, aided and abetted by current economic policy? How long are central banks happy to carry on with their policy tools fully deployed while their efficacy has become blunted? What are the consequences of resetting policy tools such as asset purchases and suppressed interest rates? What if inflation picks up?

 
Credit Spreads in Pictures. Aug 2014 PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 05 August 2014 23:34

 

Without considering fundamentals, lets look at some pictures…

 

The global economy is in relatively rude health. The US continues to grow and employment is becoming broader based. The UK is one of the faster growing economies in the developed world. China is recovering nicely as the PBOC eases. The ECB is underwritten the Eurozone economy and is cleaning up the banks. LatAm and some other emerging markets are flirting with stagflation but China, India, Indonesia, are healthy. The MENA is in turmoil and but this is in part a consequence of their waning energy importance. On balance, the world economy looks alright. But there is a right price for everything. Sadly we just don’t know what it is until after the fact. So here are a few pictures for you to make up your own minds.

Last Updated on Wednesday, 06 August 2014 06:37
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Peak Corporate Profitability. Labor's Share of Profits. Intellectual Property. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Tuesday, 24 June 2014 00:07

It is difficult for an individual to hold, accumulate or acquire intellectual property directly. Storage capacity is one issue. At best an individual can hold or acquire the last mile of the intellectual property chain. The most practical way for an individual to own intellectual property is through ownership of a company or business. (Higher education and vocational training are examples of acquiring non exclusive access to existing technology and need separate treatment.)

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Bank Regulation Investment Theme. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 12 May 2014 01:01

One of the most interesting and rewarding investment opportunities currently available trades on the reform of the banking sector. We live in a world where, unfortunately, pragmatism has for too long trumped ideology. This lack of a guiding philosophy had led banks to myopia and to overreach themselves resulting in over-levered balance sheets and inappropriate operating practices, culminating in the financial crisis of 6 years ago. Regulators are still trying to reform the banking system and this has produced a host of investment opportunities. 

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Population Distribution. Labour Mobility. Storage and Transport of Labour PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Wednesday, 16 April 2014 23:41

Current economic wisdom is that geographical labour mobility is an almost unqualified positive and an inalienable right. This should not go unquestioned.

Last Updated on Wednesday, 16 April 2014 23:47
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Inequality and Injustice. Bad Moon Rising PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Wednesday, 19 March 2014 05:11

Inequality has decreased globally, yet this aggregate phenomenon hides a more disturbing picture. As countries have become less unequal, the distribution of wealth and income within countries has become more unequal. If the material and commercial motivation for conflict between nations has receded between nations, it has certainly risen within each country.

Last Updated on Monday, 24 March 2014 03:00
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Singapore Economic Growth and Population. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 03 March 2014 00:25

 

One of the commonly accepted models of economic growth is one where economic growth is determined by capital accumulation, innovation and growth of the labour force. The growth of the labour force quickly translates into growth of the population and particular age groups which are regarded as particularly productive. This is all fine, if you can grow the population without bound. The weakness of this assumption is most apparent in the case of small islands. Singapore is a good example. Progressive immigration policy has helped growth not just in population growth but also in capital accumulation and innovation. Lately, however, the limits of immigration have been tested. The storage and transport of labour has become difficult. Incumbents have come to regard further increases in population very negatively. The government, on account of the last election’s poor result, has begun to listen to the people, to an extent. They have tightened immigration policy in sympathy to the people’s preferences. These measures are not sufficient. If the government is serious about avoiding and reversing the momentum of overpopulation, it must cut back on the creation of storage of labour. This it has not done. One can only speculate that a longer term strategy still pursues rising immigration but that an interim solution has been formulated to manage the people’s expectations. Here is how one such plan could work:

  1. The people regard the country as over populated and register their objections.
  2. The authorities tighten immigration rules to slow population growth.
  3. The authorities continue to increase population storage by land sales and the approval of building permits, etc.
  4. The stock of housing increases.
  5. The authorities can then at a later stage present a housing oversupply to the people.
  6. They authorities can present also a strategy for preventing a crash in housing prices by allowing more immigration thus increasing the demand for housing.

Thus, it would have been possible to achieve the desired population growth to sustain economic growth with the acquiescence of the people. It is a clever gambit but it fails to address the limitations faced by the island state. Population cannot be grown without bound anywhere let alone on a small island. New goals and new strategies need to be established towards a more viable society. We can only hope that the authorities have the vision to see this.

 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 04 March 2014 02:02
 
EM Bonds and USD. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Monday, 27 January 2014 02:07

Barely are we into the end of January 2014 and the emerging market debt markets are once again showing signs if weakness.

  1. Emerging markets are suffering from a slow down in exports relative to imports relative to the US and other developed markets. This is a long term trend stemming from a technology deficit.

  1. The supply of hard currencies, USD and EUR will be constrained. This will raise the effective short term interest rates for these currencies, LIBOR and other benchmarks notwithstanding. This is likely to also drive currency appreciation.

  1. The demand for emerging market debt cannot be taken in isolation. The real money investor will want to minimize or at least manage FX risk. The high yield of an Indonesian government bond or a Brazilian government bond needs to be taken in the context of either FX volatility or the cost of hedging such FX volatility.

  1. The cost of hedging the FX volatility is the short term interest rate of the currency of the respective bond. An important metric for assessing the economics of an emerging market sovereign bond is therefore the spread between the yield of the bond and the  short term interest rate. Ceteris paribus, in particular ignoring inflation expectations, the flatter the yield curve, the worse the economics of owning the bond. For example, a 10 yr Brazilian government bond yields 11% but costs 10.75% to finance. A 10 year US treasury yields 2.8% but costs 30 basis points to finance. In addition, given that US treasuries are good collateral in the repo market, a 10 yr can in practice be financed at circa 6 basis points.

  1. With Basel 3 and Solvency 2, US treasuries capital treatment and declining issuance could make them the surprise outperformer this year.

 

 
QE Taper. For Real? Fed Interest Rate Policy. PDF Print E-mail
Written by Burnham Banks   
Thursday, 09 January 2014 06:55

 

QE Taper, for real?

  • The Fed is reducing UST purchases from 45 billion USD to 40 billion USD per month, a 11.1% reduction. It is reducing Agency MBS purchases from 40 billion USD to 35 billion USD, a -12.5% reduction.
  • US treasury issuance is shrinking at roughly 18% YOY due to an increase in tax receipts as the US economy recovers. Agency MBS issuance is also slowing, by about 30% YOY as banks underwriting standards have tightened and asset quality has improved to the extent that banks are willing to retain mortgages on balance sheet.
  • This implies that despite spending fewer dollars on buying bonds, the US Fed is buying up an increasing proportion of new issuance. This is hardly tapering.

Short term interest rates, low for how long? The market expects rates to be kept low till 2015. Its possible that rates may be kept low for even longer. Why?

  • Its possible that all that bond buying by the Fed was to maintain a respectable bid to cover ratio at auction, and not to reflate the economy. Why? Surely the Fed would understand that banks lend out of capital and not liquidity and all the LSAPs would do is liquefy the financial system, not provide it with capital.
  • Treasury relied on the Fed to keep yields low so that it could refinance itself cheaply.
  • The Fed balance sheet, at 4 trillion USD has reached critical limits making general prices potentially unstable. The Fed needed to find a less risky means of refinancing Treasury.
  • This month, Jan 2014, will see the inaugural issue of Treasury FRNs (floating rate notes). Treasury needs to fund itself longer than the T Bills market. It intends to issue 2 and 3 year paper. It understands that investors will only provide longer term financing if they do not have to take on duration risk. FRNs are ideal for both lender and borrower.
  • This provides the Fed with a cheaper and less risky way of suppressing Treasury’s interest expense. The Fed only needs to keep short rates floored at zero.
  • The risk to this strategy is that whereas fixed rate debt can be inflated away, floating rate debt becomes more expensive under inflation as rates react to inflation expectations.
  • Under the above thesis, interest rates will be kept low for another 3 years or more. Unless inflation perks up.

What about long rates?

  • Inflation expectations are one of the important determinants of UST yields. US inflation numbers are low. The headline number is 1.2%, down from 1.8% a year ago. Core inflation, which excludes volatile and transitory items such as food and energy are at 1.7%, down from 1.9% a year ago. Considering that shelter is a large item in the CPI, and US housing and mortgage rates are rising, we should expect to see much slower inflation in the larger cash flow items (that is ex owner equivalent rent, which is not a cash flow item.) CPI ex shelter has fallen from 1.4% a year ago, to 1.0% today. Again, a 4% 10 year UST yield is not a foregone conclusion.
  • However, given that the US Fed is a large buyer of treasuries, the eventual withdrawal of QE is likely to steepen the term structure.
  • Take note of the US trade balance which has been recovering quite steadily. US manufacturing is rebounding, an ageing population is consuming more services and less goods, more production is being re-shored and shale gas and fracking technology is reducing reliance on energy imports mean that the US will export less USD, less exported USD will mean less demand for US treasuries, implying a steepening of the term structure.

Food for thought…

 

Last Updated on Thursday, 09 January 2014 07:53
 
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